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1 Introduction
Human beings, by nature, are gregarious. In our daily lives, we share a large portion of the eco-
nomic space with many others. These generic “others” – the proverbial Joneses – influence our
lives. They shape our decision-making, and often, our very definition of happiness. They help
set a marker, a benchmark, for what it means for any one of us to “make it” in life. And yet,
each of us struggle with mixed feelings about giving the Joneses this much power – “positional
concern” (Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2010) – over our lives. After all, their influence
shapes every facet of our lives, how much we work, how much time we spend with our fami-
lies, how big a house we live in. For some of us, this influence is motivating in nature, goading
us to work harder in an effort to keep up with the Joneses; others simply recoil from the latter’s
success. Imperceptibly, however, these consumption and leisure choices themselves shape the
overall income distribution, which in turn, determine the identity and fate of the Joneses them-
selves. This paper is an attempt to formalize this fundamental ambivalence, our fight-or-flight
response if you will, to the success of the proverbial Joneses and to study how such dialectics
affect the income distribution in a society.
Economists have long accepted the notion that our sense of well-being derives in part on
the consumption choices of the Joneses – see Luttmer (2005), Dynan and Ravina (2007), Maurer
and Meier (2008), Bertrand and Morse (2016, and Alvarez-Cuadrado et. al. (2016) for empirical
backing.1 They have investigated, at length, the notions of consumption externalities and con-
sumption benchmarking, the idea that the Joneses set the benchmark we attempt to emulate
or beat. Dupor and Liu (2003) provides an useful taxonomic classification and nomenclature.
In their language, the decisions of others can elicit feelings of jealousy or admiration in us; we
respond by keeping up with the Joneses (KUJ) or running away from the Joneses (RAJ). If a rise in
the consumption benchmark goads us to work more so we can consume more, we are said to be
keeping up with the Joneses; if it encourages us to work less and consume less, we are running
away. As Chugh (2008) puts it “...KUJ is a desire to be similar to others, while RAJ is a desire to be
different from others.”
This entire line of work uses a conventional, keeping-up preference formulation wherein
1Luttmer (2005) investigates whether people care about their relative position and if falling behind the Joneses’ di-
minish their happiness. He find thats, after controlling for individual income, higher earnings of neighbors are asso-
ciated with lower levels of self-reported happiness, suggesting the negative effect of increases in neighbors’ earnings
on own well-being is “most likely caused by interpersonal preferences people having utility functions that depend
on relative consumption in addition to absolute consumption.” Bertrand and Morse (2016) using state-year varia-
tion in incomes and consumption for U.S. data to find that poorer (“nonrich”) households consume a larger share of
their current income on conspicious items when exposed to higher income (and consumption) at the top. They find
compelling evidence “consistent with one possible causal pathway: status-seeking”.
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everyone relishes the idea of keeping up: if benchmark consumption rises, everyone responds
by taking whatever action helps increase their own consumption.2 This is unappealing: there is
no reason why responses to social changes be uniform across a large population with differing
fundamentals. There is, however, a reason why the literature generates this unattractive unifor-
mity. Much of it – except a few exceptions in finance, such as Chan and Kogan (2002) and Xiouros
and Zapatero (2010) – assumes a homogenous population, and as such, the Joneses’ decisions
are identical, in equilibrium, to that of the individual. More strikingly, in all such models, even
those that admit a heterogenous population, every agent ends up responding in one way or the
other: either they all fight or they all flee with no scope for ambivalence. This is our entry point
into this vast literature. To foreshadow, to generate ambivalence, wealth-dependent (or person-
specific) risk aversion is necessary (but not sufficient), something the literature on consumption
externalities has not touched on.3
We begin by asking, under what conditions will some individuals raise, and others reduce,
their consumption in response to the consumption of the Joneses? We examine these issues
within the broad confines of the Dupor and Liu (2003) framework. In our static model, agents
are heterogeneously-endowed with “effective time e” (or innate productive ability, if you will)
and they devote part of that time to work (at a fixed wage) and the rest to leisure. All agents
share the same underlying preferences – they care about leisure and effective consumption, an
amalgamation of own consumption and an economy-wide consumption benchmark. What is
different across agents is their risk aversion: it is person-specific (depends on e): For the most
part, we stay agnostic (as do Dupor and Liu, 2003) as to the exact origins of the benchmark.
Despite having similar preferences, the impact of a change in the benchmark on the slope of an
indifference curve – the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between leisure and consumption
– is person-specific because risk aversion is person-specific. Changes in the benchmark have
the potential – it is by no means routine – to alter the MRS, and via this channel, affect agents’
decision-making about their own consumption and leisure. If an increase in the benchmark
causes the MRS of agent i to rise (fall), he is said to keep up (run away) in the Dupor and Liu
(2003) sense.
We study situations in which diametrically-opposing behavioral responses to others’ con-
sumption – we call it fight-or-flight or more formally, dual response – can emerge, generating
endogenous differences in leisure, income, and consumption based on those influences. When
preferences generate dual response behavior, an agent with effective-time endowment, e; may
2As Barnett et. al. (2010) phrase it, “the issue of “what if they don’t?” has not received much attention”.
3There is a fair bit of evidence for risk aversion that varies with wealth, time, and other househod characteristics.
Recent examples include Guiso and Paiella (2008), Paravisini et. al (2016), and Ampudia et al (2017).
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run away from the Joneses while another agent, with e0 6= e but with the same underlying prefer-
ences, may keep up. In fact, the same agent may flee from the Joneses at one level of the bench-
mark and keep up with them at another level. We show, if preferences are additively-separable
in effective consumption and leisure, then wealth-dependent risk aversion is necessary (but not
sufficient) to generate dual response; indeed, the cut-off level of risk aversion, below which the
agent behaves one way and above which another way, turns out to be one.4
What is the raison d’être for dual response? Heuristically, an increase in the benchmark
evokes jealousy: the same consumption brings less joy knowing the benchmark is higher. (It
has no effect on the marginal utility of leisure.) This, in effect, raises the price of effective con-
sumption relative to leisure for all; everyone responds by cutting effective consumption. This
textbook-style price effect unleashes income and substitution effects and the size of these ef-
fects, of course, depends on the person and his/her risk aversion. For some, the correct response
is to work harder and increase own consumption so as to stem the fall in effective consumption;
for others, it is the opposite. A novelty of our paper is connecting such keeping-up or running-
away behavior with risk aversion under very general preferences.
What is the value-added of dual response? In the existing literature, a change in the bench-
mark always elicits the same qualitative response from, say, the rich and the poor: both respond
either by keeping up or running away from the Joneses. Not so, with dual response. Here, the
possibility arises that the rich react to an increase in the benchmark by raising their consump-
tion while the poor do the exact opposite, or vice versa. Dual response, then, has the potential
to act as an endogenous amplification (or dampening) mechanism, taking innate differences in
people and either amplifying or dampening those differences in terms of what may be observed
(such as in differences in income or consumption), via the differential, qualitative impact the
benchmark has on individual choices.
For the general class of HARA preferences, if risk aversion falls with e; we show the existence
of a cut-off e below which agents fight the Joneses and above which they flee. Loosely, your 4000
square-feet house is eye-catching when your neighbors have 2000 square-feet homes. That same
house fails to impress in the same way it once did when your neighbors build 3000 square-feet
homes. Faced with this in-your-face intrusion of the Joneses, you can choose to work harder,
earn more and build a 5000 square-feet house in an effort to successfully stay ahead. Alterna-
tively, you can live with the reduced effective consumption and enjoy a more leisurely existence
4If preferences are non-separable, then wealth-dependent risk aversion is neither necessary nor sufficient. Our
model also generates a distribution of risk-aversion, one that depends both on the person-specific e and the con-
sumption benchmark. A similar feature is present in Gollier (2004). In Chan and Kogan (2002), the only source of
heterogeneity is differences in the (constant) relative risk aversion among agents.
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partly because it has gotten so much harder to impress given a 3000 square-feet benchmark. Un-
der one parametrization of HARA preferences, we show the less-affluent in the neighborhood
choose to build a “bigger house” so as to compete; others, their “rich” neighbors, may choose
not to, and appear to “drop out”. Moreover, if the benchmark house becomes bigger, the above
mentioned cut-off e rises: all else same, more people join the rat race, work more and consume
more. The shape of the overall income distribution changes; in the case just described, income
inequality in society goes down. In the process of this societal transformation, the identity and
fate of the Joneses is not spared.5
To see this more clearly, consider two economies, A and B, identical in almost all innate as-
pects – they share the same mean and distribution of e; and the utility functions are identical
across the two economies – except, for some unspecified reason, the benchmark consumption
level in A is higher than in B. In such a setting, suppose the preferences in each country do not
display dual response but do display either KUJ or RAJ. In such a setting we show that the Gini of
labor income across the two countries is identical. However, if preferences in each country dis-
play dual response, then, ceteris paribus, the Gini of earnings in A could be lower/higher than in
B. Here, innate inequality in A and B is the same but measured income inequality is lower/higher
in the country with the higher consumption benchmark – and this is entirely due to the fight-
or-flight dialectics. This last statement may comfort policymakers who initiate action to reduce
innate inequality, hoping to reduce income inequality, but are unsuccessful.
The rest of the paper is shaped as follows. Section 2 offers a short review of the literature
while Section 3 lays out the basic environment, the general set up of preferences, and the con-
nection with risk aversion. Section 4 lays out the definitions of KUJ and RAJ, local and global,
and Sections 5-6 discuss the agent’s optimization problem and the surrounding mechanics of
flight-or-fight behavior explained in textbook income/substitution effect terms. Section 7 takes
up the HARA class of preferences to demonstrate the possibility of a fight-or-flight response. The
relation between fundamental and measured income inequality is also discussed. Section 8 il-
lustrates facets of flight-or-flight behavior in the case of endogenous benchmarking. Section 9
contains a discussion of our modeling assumption and concludes with areas for future research.
Proofs of results and additional helpful material is in the appendices.
5Frank (2009) building on insights from Veblen (1892) isolates the deeper inefficiency underlying this situation.
If each of us slog to get the additional satisfaction from having more house than the Joneses next door – Veblen’s
“ignoble form of emulation” – unaware that, all along, the Joneses are doing the same, then isn’t it possible that, for
some, the relative satisfaction gain never materializes (Hopkins and Korneinko, 2004).
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2 Literature
The literature on consumption benchmarks and other-regarding preferences has done much to
expand our understanding of societal influences on consumption choices of individuals. Much
of the progress in this line of inquiry has been in the domain of finance and macroeconomics,
mainly asset pricing, using dynamic models. Work on the consumption-leisure dimensions of
societal influences in static models is relatively sparse. There is a long line of work that studies
consumption externalities in macroeconomics; prominent examples are Duesenberry (1949),
Abel (1990, 2005), Frank (1999), de la Croix and Michel (1999), Ljunqvist and Uhlig (2000), Dupor
and Liu (2003), Gollier (2004), Liu and Turnovsky (2005), García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2008),
Alvarez-Cuadrado and Van Long (2011), Bishnu (2013), Chen et. al (2015) among many others.
While some focus on concomitant asset-pricing issues, others are more interested in the public
economics of consumption taxation in the presence of consumption externalities.6
Our work follows the strand in the literature that posit utility functions which depend not
only on the absolute value of consumption, but also on the benchmark level of consumption.
An alternative strand – see Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) and Hopkins (2008), among others
– assume people care about their ordinal rank in the consumption distribution alongside their
own consumption level. In the latter, each agent must choose how to allocate his income be-
tween a visible (positional) good and another (nonpositional) good, the consumption of which
is not seen by other agents. A classic result here is that the proportion of income spent on con-
spicuous consumption increases at each level of income, a global KUJ response of sorts.
A version of our fight-or-flight result appears in Clark and Oswald (1998; specifically, equa-
tion (10) in their paper). There, too, agents may conform (be “followers” and raise their action a
when the comparison a rises) or they may be “deviants” and do the opposite. As in our model,
who does what depends on the concavity or convexity of marginal utility from comparison,
which we translate into risk aversion. Our focus is more on the possibility that a) follower or de-
viant behavior changes with income, and b) it may depend on a itself. In previous, related work,
Barnett, Bhattacharya, and Bunzel (2010) consider a similar framework wherein agents choose
whether or not to allow the consumption decision of others to influence their own consump-
tion and work decisions. That paper introduces a two-piece, level-dependent utility function
in which agents receive a utility-kick if their consumption beats an endogenously-determined
consumption benchmark, based on the economy’s level of mean consumption. In that setting,
an agent can “drop out” thereby insulating himself from the influence of the Joneses. In equilib-
6The endogenous amplification mechanism we unearth is potentially of value to researchers studying risk and
portfolio choice and to macroeconomists studying distributional consequences of shocks.
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rium, endogenous inequality emerges – in levels of consumption, income, and leisure – and is
critically dependent on the degree of influence people draw from others as well as on the fun-
damental inequality in time endowments. The approach mimics, in some sense, the notion of
agents keeping up or running away from the influence of others (some agents will meet the chal-
lenge and join the consumption rat race while others will drop out of the race – “self-sufficient
types in Strulik, 2015). However, it does not follow the conventional taxonomy in Dupor and Liu
(2003).7 Specifically, individuals dropping out of the rat race draw no influence from the con-
sumption decisions of others, which is conceptually different from Dupor and Liu’s notion of
running away from Joneses. In keeping with Dupor and Liu, in the present paper an individual
cannot shield himself from the influence of his neighbors, but unlike Dupor and Lui, he may
respond to them in more ways than one.
In an insightful recent paper, Allen and Chakraborty (2018) allow agents to pursue the con-
sumption benchmark of those who are richer than them. Hoping to catch up, these agents work
more and save more energized by how far they fall below the aspirational benchmark. There is
no notion of RAJ in their setup, however. Gershman (2014) focuses on an aspect of the afore-
discussed ambivalence: some in his model, incentivized by KUJ effects, indulge in conspicuous
consumption and overwork, while others “hide their wealth and underinvest, constrained by the
fear of malicious envy”.
3 The model
3.1 Primitives
Consider a single-good, static economy populated with a continuum of agents – denoted by i
– distinguished by their endowment of effective time, ei; over and above the one unit of time
available to all. Assume e is distributed according to a distribution G with non-negative support
; 

, and mean e, where   1: The distribution G captures fundamental inequality, innate,
unchangeable differences between people.
Agents work and consume. Let li denote agent i’s labor supply and xi his leisure. Agent i’s
time constraint is given by xi + li = 1 + ei:8 Those with higher ei – sometimes referred to as
“richer” agents – have more effective time to devote to work and leisure. If the wage rate is w
7Also, the two-piece utility formulation is somewhat unwieldy, generates non-convexities, and hence, a role for
consumption lotteries.
8Our framework is nearly identical to that in Dupor and Liu (2003) except they measure the disutility of working
while we introduce leisure as a argument directly in the utility function.
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units of the consumption good, the budget constraint is written as
ci = wli = w
 
1 + ei   xi . (1)
We normalize w = 1 implying
ci + xi =
 
1 + ei

. (2)
This formulation, arguably, is a little unusual. To see why it is useful, consider an alterna-
tive formulation of the budget constraint: ci = wili and li + xi = 1 with wi drawn from a wage
distribution. In this case, were we to plot ci on the vertical axis and xi on the horizontal, the bud-
get line would have a slope  wi (the budget line would connect the points  0; wi and (1; 0)): In
contrast, the budget constraint considered in the paper has ci + xi =
 
1 + ei

implying a budget
line with slope 1 (independent of i). If, in fact, we permitted differences across agents in wages
and time endowments, the budget line would connect the points
 
0; wi
 
1 + ei

and
 
1 + ei; 0

:
In the case where wages differ, agents with higher wages but the same time endowment have
steeper budget lines while in the case where only the time endowment differs, the budget times
for agents with higher e have the same slope but are farther out northeast in a parallel fashion.
In short, any analysis where the difference across agents is rooted in differences in the value of
their time necessitates contending with income and substitution effects, whereas if these differ-
ences are restricted to their effective time endowment, only an income effect is present. This
makes the analysis much simpler, which is why we adopt it here. Persson and Tabellini (2002)
use the same formulation as in the current paper for similar reasons.
The utility of agent i – denoted W – is given by
W W  ci; xi (3)
where W is strictly increasing and strictly concave in each argument, i.e., W1 > 0;W2 > 0;
W11 < 0; and W22 < 0; separability, an assumption we will make at places below, requires
W21 = 0: c
i is effective consumption best thought of as an amalgamation of own consumption,
ci; and own consumption relative to a consumption benchmark, ci=cb; where cb is the bench-
mark. The benchmark may be identified as a reference point which would make W
 
ci; xi

reference-dependent (Kramer, 2016).
There is a single benchmark, same for all agents, which, loosely speaking, will be identi-
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fied as the consumption of the proverbial Joneses.9 Indeed, almost the entire analysis will pro-
ceed assuming a single exogenously-specified benchmark. In Section 8, we will allow for an
endogenously-derived benchmark.
3.2 The consumption aggregator and its properties
Let ci  f  ci; cb where f is a consumption aggregator and let   <2+ denote the feasible set
of
 
ci; xi; cb

: In this paper, we focus exclusively on a specific multiplicative form10 for f used by
Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), Dupor and Liu (2003), and Abel (2005):
Assumption 1
f
 
ci; cb

= ciA (cb) (4)
whereA A (cb) is a continuously-differentiable function of cb andA0 (cb) < 0 2 :
As we show in Appendix B, this form of amalgamation may be obtained as a generalized f-
mean of ci and relative consumption, ci=cb; but can permit a broader interpretation of how the
benchmark influences consumption.11 Abel (2005), for instance, uses
A (cb) = (cb)  ;  2 [0; 1) : (5)
Derivatives of the aggregator function determine behavioral responses to changes in the
benchmark. We have:
Jealousy-Admiration (Dupor and Liu, 2003) If @W
 
ci; xi

=@cb = W1f2 < 0 (> 0) 8
 
ci; xi

(i.e.,
f2 7 0 respectively, everywhere), the utility function displays jealousy (admiration).
Since
f1 = A; f2 = ciA0 (cb) < 0; f12 = A0 (cb) < 0; (6)
it follows that our singular focus on (4) permits only jealousy, not admiration. A few points to
note. First, this definition of jealousy measures the effect of the benchmark on one’s utility, not
on marginal utility. Second, increases in the benchmark induce jealousy in every agent – i.e.,
9Multiple benchmarks, specific to different wealth groups, can, in principle be accommodated. There, an agent
could keep up with one set of neighbors and run away from another. Our main insights, suitably adapted to that
world, would doubtless carry over.
10For completeness, Appendix A includes a discussion of the subtractive form of f:
11Special cases of the generalized f mean include the arithmetic, geometric, and harmonic means.
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takes some of the joy out of own consumption – in effect reducing their effective consumption,
and this is true however high their consumption may be.
3.3 When do the Joneses affect agent i0s decisions
Changes in the benchmark have the potential to alter the slope of agents’ indifference curves,
and via this channel, affect their decision-making. To see this, differentiate W to get dW =
@W
@ci
@ci
@ci
dci + @W
@xi
dxi: Letting zi denote the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between leisure
and consumption for agent i; we have
zi   
@W
@xi
@W
@ci
=   W2
 
f
 
ci; cb

; xi

W1 (f (ci; cb) ; xi)  f1 (ci; cb) : (7)
Dropping the arguments of W and f;
@zi
@cb
=
f2
W1f1

 W21 +W2W11
W1
+W2
f12
f2f1

: (8)
It turns out there is a nice relationship connecting a measure of risk aversion with @z
i
@cb
: Let

 
ci
   ciW11
W1
;
be the coefficient of relative risk aversion (inverse of the elasticity of substitution) defined on
effective consumption, ci, for person i.12 Using (6), rewrite (8) in terms of 
 
ci

as
@zi
@cb
=
ciA0 (cb)W2
W1Aci

1    ci  ciW21
W2

: (9)
Clearly, the Joneses have the ability to affect agent i’s decisions iff @z
i
@cb
6= 0 for some i: From
(9), this can happen when

1    ci  ciW21W2  6= 0. This condition is necessary and sufficient.
If W is assumed to be separable, i.e., W21 = 0; then the Joneses can influence agent i’s decisions
iff 
 
ci
 6= 1: Here on, we assume W is separable.13 Examples where @zi=@cb 6= 0 abound – see
Appendix C.2.
Let us take a closer look at the effect of cb on z by distinguishing its differential effect on
the marginal utilities, @W=@x and @W=@c: Changes in the benchmark have no impact on the
12Consider the coefficient of relative risk aversion defined on effective consumption 
 
ci
    ciW11
W1
; the same
coefficient, defined on ci; takes the form 
 
ci
   ci W11f1+W1f11
W1f1
: For (4), f11 = 0 and it can be checked that

 
ci

= 
 
ci

:
13Appendix C.1 studies several special functional forms that are commonly used but non-separable.
10
marginal utility of leisure, i.e., @(@W=@x)@cb = 0: However,
@ (@W=@c)
@cb
= W1A0 (cb)| {z }
 
+W11cA (cb)A0 (cb)| {z }
+
= W1A0 (cb) [1  ] : (10)
From (10), we see an increase in the benchmark has two distinct effects on marginal utility of
consumption, @W=@c: On the one hand, a higher benchmark decreases effective consumption,
thereby raising the marginal utility of effective consumption (making any incremental increase
in c more valuable to the agent) – this effect, expressed in the second middle term on the r.h.s of
(10), has a positive impact on @W=@c. On the other hand, a higher benchmark means increases
in consumption have a smaller impact on effective consumption – jealousy – making any in-
cremental increase in c less valuable to the agent.14 These conflicting effects are embodied in
; cf. the last term on the r.h.s of (10). Since the benchmark has no impact on the marginal
utility of leisure, those who see a net increase (decrease) in their valuation of c will now be less
(more) reluctant to swap c for x: To foreshadow, it is this differential effect on the willingness to
substitute c for x that lies at the core of dual response – fight and flight. Below, in Section 5, we
offer a detailed examination of when we might see these effects dominate one other in the same
economy.
4 KUJ, RAJ
Starting from any initial allocation, consider an increase in cb: Following Dupor and Liu (2003),
define (Global) Keeping up with the Joneses (G-KUJ) and (Global) Running away from the Jone-
ses (G-RAJ) as:15
G-KUJ @z
i
@cb
> 0 8  ci; xi 2 
G-RAJ @z
i
@cb
< 0 8  ci; xi 2 
Heuristically, if the agent’s preferences display KUJ, his eagerness to substitute away from
leisure into work – the marginal rate of substitution, z – increases when benchmark consump-
tion rises; see how in Figure 1 the indifference curve pivots from the initial black to the orange
(flatter curve), with an increase in the benchmark. The opposite is true if his preferences display
RAJ, as illustrated by the steeper, red curve.
14Continuing with the housing fable from the introduction, at the margin, you get more satisfaction from living in
a slightly bigger house when the neighbors have done so. But, at the same time, the slightly bigger house does not do
as much for you as before because the goalpost has moved out further.
15Gollier (2004) defines the degree of conformism as the increase in an agent’s consumption that leaves his mar-
ginal utility unchanged for a unit increase in the consumption benchmark.
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Figure 1: KUJ (orange) & RAJ (red)
It is worth re-emphasizing the definitions of keeping up or running away apply globally, i.e.,
they apply everywhere in the feasible, positive orthant, irrespective of the agent’s initial alloca-
tion; hence the label, global. An implication of framing the definition thusly is if any agent dis-
plays KUJ (or RAJ) everyone will. Any fundamental differences between people – here, captured
by heterogeneity in e – will not render differences in the direction of their response to a change in
cb:
It bears emphasis here that the entire literature on consumption externalities, to date, has
studied preferences which satisfy either G-KUJ or G-RAJ.16 We depart from the existing litera-
ture and demonstrate below, that for a large class of preferences, @zi=@cb may be positive (or
negative) locally, i.e., only for a subset of the feasible, positive orthant, not everywhere. For such
preferences (see Figure 2) people in different portions of the consumption space, those with dif-
ferent e; may respond very differently – substitute away or toward work – to a given change in
the benchmark.17 Define   K [R and define (Local) Keeping up with the Joneses (L-KUJ)
over a portion of the commodity space, K ; and (Local) Running away from the Joneses (L-RAJ)
at some other portion of the commodity space, R as:18
16Kawamoto (2009) studies a two-class, two-period overlapping generations model in which all agents have status
concerns and some agents keep up with the Joneses and others run away. However, this bifurcation emerges as a
result of differences in preferences that are exogenously imposed.
17In Figure 2, as drawn, agents at the initial allocation A display KUJ while those at B display RAJ.
18A brief comment about the equivalence between two seemingly-different definitions of KUJ and RAJ. One such
definition – the one proposed by Dupor and Liu (2003) – is discussed above and relies on how the MRS changes
with a change in the benchmark. For example, if the agent’s preferences display KUJ, his desire to substitute away
from leisure into work increases, which raises his income, but does that mean he chooses to consume more? An
12
L-KUJ @z
i
@cb
j(ci;xi)2K > 0
L-RAJ @z
i
@cb
j(ci;xi)2R < 0
Similar global and local notions for jealousy and admiration are possible but not explored
further in this paper. As stated above in Assumption 1, we focus exclusively on f forms satisfying
jealousy globally.
Figure 2: L-KUJ (orange) and L- RAJ (red)
We now turn to formal definitions of dual response and develop understanding of the economics
underlying the phenomenon.
5 Dual response: Fight or Flight
Henceforth, refer to the set of
 
ci; xi

in  in which L-KUJ holds as K ; and L-RAJ holds as R;
respectively. Note, these sets depend on cb:
Definition (dual response) Preferences are said to display dual response if both K and R are
non-empty.
alternative definition, briefly commented on by Dupor and Liu (2003), says yes; an agent exhibits KUJ if an increase
in the consumption of the Joneses incentivizes the agent to choose to increase his own consumption. In Appendix E ,
we show these definitions are equivalent, that is the sign of @zi=@cb at
 
ci; xi

=
 
c^i; x^i

is the same (opposite) sign
as @c^i=@cb (@x^i=@cb):
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Dual response (or the fight-or-flight response) implies @z
i
@cb
has one sign for some (c; x) and the
opposite sign at some other (c; x) in the feasible space. In particular, an agent with endowment
e can be seen running away from the Joneses – the flight response – while another agent with
e0 6= e but with the same underlying preferences, keeps up – the fight response. Indeed, as will be
apparent below, it is even possible for the same person to respond differently to a change in the
benchmark depending on the initial level of the benchmark.
5.1 When can @zi=@cb change sign?
We would like to know more about whether @zi=@cb can change sign over the expanse of the
consumption possibilities set, . Specifically, it follows from (9) that when W is separable; for
@zi
@cb
to change sign, 1    cimust as well. This, in turn, requires   ci to vary sufficiently with
ci and for ci itself to vary with ei: The latter can happen in one of two ways.
1. The sign of @z
i
@cb
varies across individuals: If 
 
ci

varies with ei and 
 
ci

> 1 for some i
and 
 
cj

< 1 for some j; then @z
i
@cb
is of one sign for i and a different sign for j. Clearly,
wealth-dependent risk aversion, in fact sufficient heterogeneity in it – enough to straddle
unity – is necessary to getting @zi=@cb to change sign over the consumption landscape.
2. The sign of @z
i
@cb
varies for a given individual as cb changes. If 
 
ci

varies with ci which, in
turn, varies with cb; @z
i
@cb
can be of one sign for i at some level of cb and have a different sign
for the same i at another level of cb: That is, for a given i; 1    () may change sign with a
change in the benchmark.
Before proceeding further, we supply an example where @z
i
@cb
does change sign:
Example 1 (Dual response) Consider a simple form of additively-separable, Stone-Geary prefer-
ences:
W
 
ci; xi

=
 
ci   'c

+
 
xi
1 
;  2 (0; 1) ; 'c > 0
where
 
ci; x

must satisfy ci 'c > 0 and xi > 0. In Appendix F, we show 
 
ci

= (1  ) ci
ci 'c
and @z
i
@cb
= c
i 'c
ci 'c :Clearly,
@zi
@cb
can change sign. Since ci 'c > 0 must hold, it follows @z
i
@cb
changes
sign depending on the level of effective consumption:
@zi
@cb
< 0() 'c < ci <
'c

@zi
@cb
> 0() ci > 'c

> 'c
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Apropos Point 1 above, there can be many reasons why 
 
ci

varies with ei: The simplest
such reason would be non-homotheticity of W as exemplified by the Stone-Geary form in Ex-
ample 1. Here ci depends on ei (as would be expected, for most utility functions) but due to the
non-homotheticity ofW , this dependence carries over to ci; and hence to 
 
ci

=   ciW11W1 :We
formalize this idea in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (No dual response) a. (C.E.S class) Suppose W is of the C.E.S form such that
W
 
ci; xi

= 


 
ci

+ (1  )  xik=
where  > 0 is a constant, 0 <  < 1;   1 and 0 < k  1: Then, preferences exhibit G-KUJ if
 < 0 and G-RAJ if  > 0.19
b. (No dual response) Suppose W is homothetic and additively separable in
 
ci; xi

for any given
cb: Then, dual response does not obtain.
The proof can be found in Appendix C.2, Example 6. 20
Where do this leave us in our quest to find the possibility of dual response? Two important
utility classes – one homothetic, the other additively-separable and C.E.S – fail to generate dual
response. Additionally, multiplicatively-separable preferences, W
 
ci; xi

= h
 
ci

v
 
xi

; can-
not generate dual response – see Appendix D. Our search for dual response must take us outside
the realm of these preference classes.
In passing, it is instructive to ask the question, how is any of this potentially useful? In the
existing literature, a change in the benchmark always elicits an identical qualitative response
from the rich and the poor; both respond either by keeping up or running away. With dual
response, the possibility arises that the rich react to the Joneses by raising their consumption
and the poor do the opposite, or vice versa. Dual response, then, can act as an endogenous
amplification or dampening mechanism, taking fundamental differences and either amplifying
or dampening them via individual choices and market outcomes. This is the promise that dual
response holds out.
19Of course, the elasticity of substitution in this case is  = 1= (1  ) : Proposition (1) can then be restated in terms
of , i.e., preferences are G-KUJ or G-RAJ depending on whether  is less than or greater than 1, respectively. When
k = ; the coefficient of relative risk aversion is constant; 
 
ci

= 1=
20Note also, homotheticity of W in
 
ci; xi

, in general, does not necessarily imply homotheticity of W in
 
ci; xi

.
The two are the same if and only if, as in (4), f is homogenous of degree 1 in ci for a given benchmark cb:
Part b of Proposition 1 is really a corollary to Part a; it follows from Bergson’s Theorem which states that if a utility
function is quasi-concave, increasing, and separable, it is homothetic if and only if it is of the C.E.S. form.
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6 The agent’s problem redux
The first order conditions for the agent’s problem of maximizing (3) subject to (2) and the aggre-
gator, ci  f  ci; cb can be summarized by
W1
 
ci; xi

f1  W2
 
ci; xi

= 0, W2
 
c^i; x^i

W1 (c^i; x^i)
 f1, (11)
where a hat (“^”) denotes optimal choices; also, in writing (11), we have assumed interior solu-
tions for choice variables ci andxi, and c^i  f  c^i; cb. The second order condition isW11  c^i; x^i f21 +
W1
 
c^i; x^i

f11 +W22
 
c^i; x^i

< 0.
Before getting into the mathematical nitty-gritties, a simple textbook approach to our prob-
lem is in order. First, reinterpret the agent’s problem as one of choosing c and x to maximize
W (c; x) subject to the budget constraint c
i
A(cb) +x
i =
 
1 + ei

implying the relative price of effec-
tive consumption in terms of leisure is p  1=A (cb) : Then (11) gives W1
 
ci; xi

= pW2
 
ci; xi

:
Figure 3a summarizes this basic problem for a given agent i drawn in (x; c) space. The slope
of the original budget line, FE, is  A (cb) : In this formulation, the effect of an exogenous in-
crease in cb; by assumption, reduces A (cb) – raises p – meaning the relative price of c has gone
up or equivalently, the relative price of leisure has fallen; consequently, the budget line pivots
inward, as indicated by the new budget line F 0E: Consider an agent who chose the point H be-
fore the benchmark increase. After the change, the same agent chooses H 0. His new bundle has
less c but more x: Alternatively, if the agent was originally at I; that agent, after the benchmark
change, would be at I 0 : his new bundle has less c and less x:
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Figure 3a: KUJ/RAJ for an agent i
Why the difference between the two responses? Two effects are at play here. First, an increase
in cb; as noted, reduces the relative price of leisure making it more attractive. On the other hand,
the increase in p causes the budget set to shrink (reduces the purchasing power of the endow-
ment in terms of c) rendering the original bundle of (x; c) unaffordable. This is the income
effect. We don’t know which effect will dominate, in general. When the agent moves from point
H to H 0, it is the substitution effect that dominates; the opposite is true if the agent moves from
I to I 0. In the former case, he works less so his c is lower; he is running away from the Joneses.
In the latter, he is keeping up; his c rises because he works more. In either case, his c is lower,
though c may rise or fall, depending on the leisure response. Evidently, the curvature of the in-
difference curves – steepness at point H vs. I – plays an important part in determining whether
he keeps up or runs away.
Figure 3b makes the point that two agents with very different ei may react differently to a
change in the benchmark. In Figure 3b, the agent with the higher e is initially at H: After the
change in cb; he is at H 0 : the substitution effect of an increase in cb causes him to move to H 00
and the income effect from H 00 to H 0: The poorer agent moves from L to L0 : for this agent, the
substitution effect of an increase in cb causes him to move to L00 and the income effect from L00
to L0: Notice though, the magnitude of these effects for the same change in cb is vastly different
across the two agents. This is why an agent with endowment e may exhibit RAJ while another
17
with endowment e0 6= e may exhibit KUJ even though they share the same underlying prefer-
ences.
Figure 3b: KUJ/RAJ for two differently-endowed agents
The discussion above, framed as a choice over x and c; is useful for grasping the general
intuition of dual response because the analysis of changes in the benchmark can be cast in terms
of textbook price effects. However, since the agent’s actual choice is over x and c; it may be
instructive to understand dual response within the latter context, one where the agent chooses
x and c by maximizing W (cA (cb) ; x) subject to c + x = 1 + e: Note, here a change in cb has
no effect on the budget line; instead, it changes the shape of the indifference curves. Figure
4 portrays the choice problem of two different agents, one poor, the other rich. The dashed
lines represent budget lines of these agents, the black curves, labeled I (cb), J (cb), represent the
highest-attainable indifference curves for each agent, for a given benchmark, cb:
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Figure 4: KUJ and RAJ and associated price & income effects
The poorer (wealthier) agent’s choice
 
c^i; x^i

is summarized by pointA(A0). Now consider an
increase in the benchmark, from cb to c0b. The red curves in the figure, I (c
0
b), J (c
0
b) represent new
indifference curves associated with the higher benchmark. We identify a level of consumption
c^ at which these new indifference curves are tangent to the old curves I (cb), J (cb), shown as
pointsQ andQ0, respectively. Consider now the indifference curve – the blue curve, I1 (c0b) – that
passes through the initial choice for the poorer agent, point A. The slope at A is flatter than the
slope of the budget line, meaning the agent will choose to substitute away from leisure (work
and consume more) in response to the increase in cb, i.e., she keeps up with the Joneses (locally,
for this agent, @zi=@cb > 0, where for a small change in cb; the slope of I1 (c0b) at A is @z
i=@cb).
The agent’s new choice is represented at point B, where the indifference curve I2 (c0b) is tangent
to the budget line (and has the slope  1). The opposite is true for the wealthier agent. Here
the curve J (c0b), passing through the initial choice A
0, is steeper, meaning for this agent, locally,
@zi=@cb < 0. The agent then chooses to work and consume less; he runs way from the Joneses,
as shown by point B0, where the indifference curve J2 (c0b) is tangent to this agent’s budget line.
Next, we formally flesh out the Slutsky decomposition for a cross price increase in p – cap-
turing the income and substitution effects of a change in p (via a change in cb) on x^i where x^i is
19
defined in (11):
@x^i
@p
=

@x^i
@p

U fixed
  c^i @x^
i
@ (1 + ei)
Here, the income effect is captured by  c^i @x^i
@(1+ei)
, the substitution effect by

@x^i
@p

U fixed
and the
total effect is @x^
i
@p : It is useful to recall that the effect of an exogenous increase in cb raises pmean-
ing the relative price of c has gone up or that the relative price of leisure has fallen.
Proposition 2 The total effect of a change in the benchmark on leisure is given by
@x^i
@p
=
1
p c^
iW11 () +W2 ()
 pW22 ()  1pW11 ()
;
the substitution effect by
@x^i
@p

U fixed
=
W2 ()
 pW22 ()  1pW11 ()
> 0;
and the income effect by
 c^i
 1pW11 ()
 pW22 ()  1pW11 ()
where the denominator,  pW22 ()  1pW11 () > 0 by the second order condition. The substitution
effect, W2() pW22()  1pW11()
> 0; and the income effect,
1
p
c^iW11()
 pW22()  1pW11()
< 0:
The substitution effect is always positive; this means as the relative price of effective con-
sumption (p) increases, the agent substitutes out of effective consumption into leisure. The in-
come effect is negative meaning as the relative price of effective consumption (p) increases, the
purchasing power of his endowment in terms of effective consumption decreases – the budget
set shrinks. In isolation, this income effect will decrease leisure if leisure is a normal good. (This
means for dual response to obtain, it is necessary that leisure be a normal good, which is assured
under the assumption of separability in our two-good setting (see Kubler et. al., 2014). The size
of these effects depends on i: Notice, the total effect of a change in the benchmark is given by
1
p
c^iW11 () + pW2 ()
 pW22 ()  1pW11 ()
=  1
p
c^iW11 () +W1 ()
pW22 () + 1pW11 ()
=  1
p
W1 ()
h
c^iW11()
W1() + 1
i
pW22 () + 1pW11 ()
=  1
p
W1 ()

1    ci
pW22 () + 1pW11 ()
(12)
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using W1 () = pW2 () : Dual response refers to a situation where the direction of this total ef-
fect changes with i: As (12) makes clear, this is impossible if 
 
ci

=  8i or   ci 7 1 8i:
This explains why apropos Appendix C.2 (Example 6), dual response cannot obtain under C.E.S
preferences or, more generally, under homothetic utility which produces person-invariant :
7 HARA utility
The dual-response result discussed above has the potential to split (endogenously) the popu-
lation into separate camps, those that keep up and those that run away from the Joneses. We
explore this below for the concrete example of hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) prefer-
ences.21 HARA, as is well known, is the most general class of utility functions used in practice.
A utility function exhibits hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) if and only if the recipro-
cal of absolute risk aversion is a linear function of wealth. A general, additively-separable form
of HARA preferences can be written as
W (c; x) =
1  


'c +
cc

1  

+ 
1  


'x +
xx
1  

; c; x > 0;  > 0 (13)
where (c; x) have to satisfy 'c +
cc
1  > 0 and 'x +
xx
1  > 0; 'c and 'x can be negative but
'c (   1) > 0 must hold. Under various restrictions on ; 'c;and 'x; HARA encompasses a
wide class of commonly-used utility functions such as the linear, quadratic, exponential, power
(including isoelastic), Stone-Geary, and logarithmic. If 'c = 'x = 0, then (13) is homothetic in
(c; x); otherwise not. Also 'c < 0 has the flavor of a minimum consumption requirement – cf.
Appendix F.
Define k 

x
Ac
 1
 1
. Using (4), it is easy to check that (c; x) satisfy 'c +
cc
1  > 0 and
'x +
xx
1  > 0 if c
i    'cAc (1  ) and xi   
'x
x
(1  ) : Using
W1 = c

'c +
cAci
1  
 1
and W2 = x

'x +
xix
(1  )
 1
, (14)
(7) yields
zi =  
0@k

'x +
xxi
1 

'c +
cci
1 
1A 1 . (15)
For subsequent use, the exact expressions for the solution to the agent’s problem under (13) are
21Appendix F works out the special but popular and analytically tractable case of Stone-Geary utility.
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as follows:
c^i =
(k'x   'c) (1  ) + kx
 
1 + ei

(cA+ kx) (16)
and
x^i =
cA
 
1 + ei
  (k'x   'c) (1  )
(cA+ kx) . (17)
For future use, write c^i compactly as
c^i = a+ b
 
1 + ei

where (18)
a  (k'x   'c) (1  ) = (cA+ kx)
b  kx= (cA+ kx) > 0
k 

x
Ac
 1
 1
Clearly, an advantage of the HARA form is that while it permits non-homotheticity (if either or
both of'c and'x are non-zero), it nevertheless delivers decision rules that are linear in e: So as to
not get overly taxonomic, below we focus our attention on a subset of parameters that satisfy22
Assumption 2 'c < 0 and  < 1.
Note, even under Assumption 2, the sign of a is, in general, indeterminate. If 'x > 0; then
Assumption 2 guarantees a > 0:
7.1 Dual response and HARA
For future use,
i
 
ci

=
(1  )cci
cci + 'c (1  )
, (19)
for the HARA, which, as well-known, equals a constant 1    when 'c = 0. This clarifies the
importance of 'c : when 'c = 0; 
i
 
ci

= (1  ) 8i and dual response cannot obtain. Note
though if 'x 6= 0; even with 'c = 0; (13) is non-homothetic revealing that non-homotheticity is
not sufficient to generate dual response.
22For (13) to be well-defined, 'c (   1) > 0must hold. Our point is to try and reduce clutter by focusing attention
on 'c < 0 and  < 1: We have worked out the case where 'c > 0 and  > 1 and verified that fight-or-flight behavior
is observed in the latter case as well.
22
Recall from (9) what is ultimately responsible for dual response is the sign of 1     ci : As
evident from (19), if 'c = 'x = 0 (i.e., (13) is homothetic), then, as previously discussed, @z
i=@cb
does not change sign: dual-response does not obtain. Hence, it is imperative we explore some
shifters of 
 
ci

as well as summarize some of its key properties.
Lemma 1 Assume agents’ preferences are represented by (13). The coefficient of relative aversion
i
 
ci

displays the following properties:
i. @i
 
ci

=@'c < 0; and lim
'c!0
i
 
ci

= 1  .
ii. @i
 
ci

=@ci < 0.
iii. @i
 
ci

=@A > 0:
iv. @2i
 
ci

=@ci@A ? 0.
One such shifter is 'c: Note 
i
 
ci

is decreasing in 'c – risk aversion is lower for all levels of
consumption, when 'c < 0 (i.e., 1  < i
 
ci

when 'c < 0). If one interprets 'c as subsistence
consumption, then it apparent the rich are willing to accept more risk, because any given reduc-
tion in ci (induced by jealousy) will not compromise their ability to consume the subsistence
consumption as much as it would for the poor whose consumption is closer to 'c:
(ii) above states that @i
 
ci

=@ci < 0: For a given cb, this implies agents are less risk averse
at higher consumption levels. Raising the benchmark decreases agents’ aversion to risk. It also
implies risk aversion is decreasing in e.
At the cutoff ci = ~cb  A (~cb) ; by definition, i (~cb) = 1. Since i
 
ci

is monotone in ci; it
follows that i
 
ci

? 1 for ci ? ~cb :
The following proposition establishes the possibility of dual response for HARA preferences.
Proposition 3 a)The HARA utility function exhibits dual response iff 'c 6= 0. Specifically,
@zi
@cb
=
8<: > 0 for ci < c : L-KUJ< 0 for ci > c : L-RAJ for  < 1 ;
where, given a cb;
c  'c (   1)
cA (cb) (20)
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and c falls in the allowable range of consumption defined earlier.
b) From (20), along with (18), identify an endowment e associated with consumption c;
e  max

'c (   1)
cAb  
a
b
  1; 

: (21)
For  < 1; @zi=@cb > 0 for all agents with ei  e; and @zi=@cb < 0 if ei > e:
The proof is in Appendix 3. Notice 'c = 0 ) c = 0; so we have G-KUJ in the entire con-
sumption range; no dual response here. Of paramount importance is the convenience that we
can “turn on” dual response or turn it off by changing 'c:
Proposition 3 establishes that a subset of the positive orthant – the demarcation happens at
e – exhibits one kind of behavior while the remaining portion exhibits the other kind. That is,
when 'c (   1) > 0; the preferences in (13) display dual response; they cannot be characterized
as either G-KUJ or G-RAJ. This mirrors what is depicted in Figure 4 (the solid blue line in the
figure represents c).
Finally, note that cut-off consumption c  'c( 1)cA also depends on the benchmark, with
@c
@cb
= 'c( 1)cA A0 (cb) > 0: (This effect is not shown in Figure 4 so as to keep the discussion simple).
The upshot is the following. For HARA preferences, we derive some clear predictions. Agents
with innate ability below a threshold keep up with the Joneses while those above it run away.
Loosely speaking, the poor react to an increase in benchmark consumption by working harder
to raise their consumption; the rich do the exact opposite. While some in the neighborhood
choose to build a “bigger house” to compete, others, their slightly more-affluent neighbors, may
choose not to and appear to “drop out”. Moreover, if the consumption of the Joneses goes up,
the above mentioned threshold rises: all else same, more people respond by keeping up.
7.2 Dual response and effects on inequality
Recall G; the distribution of e; captures fundamental inequality, the innate differences between
people. Our framework allows us to examine inequality in measured incomes given this funda-
mental inequality.
To be precise, agents are endowed with 1+ei;not ei:Recall, optimal consumption (and hence,
income, yi; in this static framework) is of the form: yi = a + b
 
1 + ei

where a and b are con-
stants which depend on the preference primitives as well as on the benchmark, cb. Suppose the
measure of inequality is chosen to be the commonly-used Gini coefficient. One can ask, how
does the Gini of yi;call it y; change when the benchmark changes? Does it matter to inequality
24
whether there is dual response?23 Below, we examine the properties of the Gini and its link to
dual response.
It is easy to check (see Appendix H) that if yi is of the form a+ b
 
1 + ei

then we can write the
Gini as
y =
b (1 + e)
a+ b (1 + e)
1+e;
where e is the mean endowment. Evidently, the difference between y and 1+e depends on b
and, most critically, on the magnitude and sign of a. In particular, if a < 0, measured income
will display greater inequality than in e. On the other hand, measured income displays lower
inequality (when a > 0), i.e., y < 1+e. For the HARA form, using the explicit form of a and b
(defined in eq. (18)) we obtain
y =
kx (1 + e)
(k'x   'c) (1  ) + kx (1 + e)
1+e:
Below, we study settings in which the benchmark changes, changing with it both a and b:Therein
will lie the possibility that as cb increases, the economy will switch from one where income in-
equality is greater than fundamental inequality to one where it is less. The following proposition
summarizes the effect of the benchmark on the Gini:
Proposition 4 a. The effect on the Gini of y of an increase in the exogenous benchmark, in the
presence of dual response, is given by
@y
@cb
=
(1 + e)
[a+ b (1 + e)]2

  'cxkA (cA+ kx)2
A0 (cb)

1+e < 0
b. If 'c = 0; i.e., in the absence of dual response, the benchmark does not impact the Gini of y.
The proof of Proposition (4) is in Appendix I. To get some intuition, examine the change in
individual consumption with respect to the benchmark, i.e. the derivative @ci=@cb: Using (18),
we have
@ci
@cb
=
@a
@cb
+
@b
@cb
 
1 + ei

:
We’ve shown @b=@cb < 0 iff  < 1: Notice this negative effect on ci is more pronounced the
23Our analysis here is cast in a partial equilibrium setting withw held fixed at 1. The inequality in income being dis-
cussed here is not of the market-driven kind. If wages were endogenously determined, say, in a competitive market,
additional effects on inequality would doubtless emerge which would also influence the pass-through.
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larger the time endowment
 
1 + ei

: On the other hand, the derivative @a=@cb can take either
sign (see Appendix I) and is independent of ei: Since @b=@cb < 0; richer agents will be more
likely to decrease their consumption as the benchmark increases, consistent with the result that
higher-endowment agents display RAJ. On the other hand, agents with lower endowments will
increase their incomes, consistent with keeping up, making it clear how dual response is driving
the decrease in inequality.
All the action in the model works off of three features of preferences: homotheticity, dual
response, and the consumption benchmark. How do each of these contribute to inequality?
Below, we discuss the possibility that as cb increases, the economy will switch from one where
income inequality is less than fundamental inequality to one where it is greater.
1. Homothetic with or without consumption externalities: Whenever preferences are ho-
mothetic, consumption is linear and proportional to the gross endowment; as a result,
income inequality is identical to fundamental inequality. In the particular case of HARA,
the preference is homothetic in (c; x) when 'x = 'c = 0; in this case, a = 0; and y = 1+e.
Whether or not there are consumption externalities, a = 0 and b does not affect the in-
equality, so any change in the distribution of the endowments gets mirrored exactly as a
change in observed inequality.
2. Non-homothetic preferences that do not permit dual response: As shown above, if we set
'x 6= 0 but 'c = 0, preferences are not homothetic and there is no dual response. In this
case, a =  k'x (   1) = (c + kx) < 0 and inequality will exceed fundamental inequal-
ity. Allowing for preferences that permit dual response ('c 6= 0) raises a, dampening the
magnitude of income inequality. Income inequality may still be greater than fundamental
inequality (if a < 0) but it is definitely smaller than when 'c = 0 (no dual response). This
showcases the effect dual response has on measured inequality.
3. The benchmark, in and of itself, will also directly impact a and b; and hence income in-
equality.
8 Endogenous benchmarking
Now that the barebones structure has been analyzed, we allow for an endogenous benchmark
by setting it at a proportion of the cross-sectional average consumption (which, in turn, is en-
dogenously derived). Setting the benchmark to a simple affine function of mean consumption
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has the advantage that all consumption levels can be expressed as a linear function of the first
moment of the distribution of e. 24
Assume benchmark consumption is the aspirationalc;where c is mean consumption (which
in this case, will correspond to the consumption of the agent with mean endowment 1 + e; if
the consumption decision rule is linear in ei), and  > 0 (typically,   1) is a constant. That
is, set cb = c: Let 
 
1 + ei; cb

denote the closed-form solution for the consumption decision
rule for the agent with ei. Mean consumption c is then a fixed point of the following equation,
c =  (e; c). Once c is computed, we can set the benchmark to be cb = c: Changing  allows
us to change the endogenous benchmark. These issues are developed below in the context of
specific preferences.
Example 2 Let preferences be of the HARA form – eq. (13) – with  = 0:5; c = x = 1;  =
1:5; 'c =  0:5; 'x =  0:5;  = 1=2;  = 1=2 and A (cb) = (cb)  : The underlying distribution of e
is Fréchet with minimum value  = 1=2, shape parameter  = 2, and scale parameter  = 1: For
this constellation of parameters, the benchmark cb is set at  times the mean consumption in the
economy. In the figures below, we vary  from 1=5 to 5 to see the importance of the influences of
the Joneses.
In order to effectively illustrate the impact of changes in the benchmark across a broad stra-
tum of the population, we express, in the left-hand panel, the ratio of consumption against a
benchmark consumption value associated with  = 0 (no consumption externality case). 25 The
figure shows agents placed at different points of the e distribution: the 10%, 30%, 50%, 70%, and
90% and their response to changes in the benchmark as we vary  from 1=5 to 5. The right-hand
panel displays a similar ratio for leisure. The graphs for consumption, for the larger values of
, are in ascending order (10%, 30%,...) starting from the top down. Initially as the benchmark
rises, agents at all points in the distribution cut their consumption – they exhibit LRAJ. As the
benchmark rises further, say, crosses 1.8, dual response obtains: some agents continue to exhibit
LRAJ while others are starting to exhibit LKUJ; eventually for a high-enough benchmark, every-
one in this example, except for those at the 90th percentile of the distribution, exhibits LKUJ. The
panel on the right-hand side, depicting leisure, provides a look at the flip-side of consumption
dual response. Here, the graphs for the larger values of  are in descending order (90%, 70%,...)
starting from the top. Initially, all agents choose to consume more leisure as  rises; eventually,
however, all but the agent at the 90th percentile enjoy less leisure as  increases.
24On the other hand, adopting the economy’s median (or other quantile) of the consumption level as the bench-
mark brings into play aspects of the distribution, other than the mean (such as, the spread of the distribution).
25The Abel form A (cb) = (cb)  does not permit us to normalize against consumption values associated with no
benchmark, i.e., cb = 0:
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Figure 5a. Consumption relative to baseline Figure 5b. Leisure relative to baseline.
9 Discussion and concluding remarks
This paper explores the possibility of generating keeping up and running away – from the Jone-
ses behavior among agents who share the same underlying preferences for leisure and consump-
tion relative to a benchmark set by the Joneses. Previous work had utilized with models in which
all agents either keep up or they all flee from the Joneses. This is at odds with common obser-
vation that some enjoy keeping up on the hedonic treadmill while others choose to stay away.
The analysis is novel because a) such fight-or-flight conflict does not arise in existing models of
consumption externalities, b) it arises endogenously here, and c) it exposes a deep connection
between the fight-or flight-response and wealth-dependent risk aversion of agents and explains
the behavior in terms of textbook income/substitution effects. This last point deserves a bit
more attention. The existing literature on asset pricing in finance has long studied the impor-
tance of agent heterogeneity in generating reasonable dynamics in asset prices. While Chan and
Kogan (2002) assume a continuum of investors who differ from each other with respect to the
curvature of their utility functions, Barberis and Shleifer (2003) and Hong and Stein (2009) sim-
ply assume two different kinds of traders. Our setup generates differences in curvature of utility
functions by assuming heterogeneity in “innate ability” (not unlike that assumed in Gomes and
Michaelides, 2007) and by assuming agents care about their consumption relative to a bench-
mark.
The notion of a single benchmark for all can be reinterpreted as a threshold, which, upon
crossing it leaves one with the feeling of having “made it” in life. Frank (1985) disagrees and
argues why per-capita wealth may not be a good wealth reference point for every agent, i.e., why
local status may be of more concern to consumers than global status. Presumably, such local
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status concerns are easily adopted in our setup by allowing for multiple benchmarks. The issue
of “choosing one’s pond” that occupies Frank’s (1985) attention could then be addressed.
Similarly, following Azariadis et. al (2013), in principle one could incorporate benchmarks
relating to leisure, and have utility be defined on effective leisure. In such a setting, the feeling of
having made it in life would come to those who get to enjoy more leisure than their neighbors.26
Since our notion of dual response is largely driven by relative price effects, it is our conjecture
that similar sorts of effects would also arise and generate fight-or-flight in this other setting.
While the paper studies the fight or flight response in the context of consumption-leisure
responses, it is easy to imagine that the essentials of the analysis can be applicable in other
economic arena, such as the consumption of environmental or health goods. Similarly, as we do
in a separate paper, one can study the consequences of such preferences for risk-taking behavior
(along the lines explored in Hopkins, 2016) and portfolio choice. Extending the analysis to agents
with time-inconsistent preferences and looking for optimal taxation along the lines of Guo and
Krause (2015) is a worthy exercise. Finally, a way to extend the analysis in the paper would be
to take inspiration from Kubler et.al. (2014) and ask, could we generate preferences that render
a good as normal in one part of the income space and inferior in another. These are interesting
issues to take up in subsequent research.
Our analysis has been conducted entirely in a static framework. How would dual response
manifest itself in a two-period setting? To keep matters simple, suppose agents live for two pe-
riods (today and tomorrow) and consume and work in each period (the wage rate is still fixed
at 1); more crucially, suppose the benchmark is the same in both periods. To continue with our
leading example involving housing, suppose the Joneses build a bigger house today. The agent,
in the current setting, has more choices than before. He could respond by working harder today,
save more, and build a bigger house tomorrow; he could work harder today, save more, and live
on in the same house tomorrow; work harder today, save less, and live on in the same house
tomorrow; cut down on work today, save more and build a bigger house tomorrow; and so on.
The part about saving less or more will depend, as usual, on his income and the interest rate and
whether consumption in each period is a normal good. If wage rates change over time, then the
agent will incorporate that into his decision-making and work harder in periods where the wage
is higher. (See more on this below.) The upshot is that dual response can easily emerge in this
dynamic setting. It is quite possible a person exhibits KUJ behavior in his youth and RAJ behav-
26Godwin (2018) pontificates on how the rich and famous have made leisure competitive for the rest of us. “Increas-
ingly, our leisure time is not leisure as our parents or grandparents might have enjoyed it: time away from the pro-
ductive demands of work for pottering, ambling, collecting, socialising. It is leisure with an imperative, self-imposed
or otherwise, to maximise relaxation yield, compete over hobby production and co-opt every activity – exercising,
meditating, making Halloween costumes for the kids – into a dynamic of human perfectibility.”
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ior in his later years. By implication, it seems possible a parent may exhibit KUJ in his lifetime
but the child may go the other way in his. A more complete study of the dynamic choices would
be a worthy topic for future study.
A key component of the preference structure, at least in the HARA framework, used to obtain
dual response is the parameter, 'c: Most commonly, this parameter (if negative) is linked to a
minimum or subsistence level of consumption. A pertinent query, then, is whether or not dual
response can prevail in economies with economic growth. A simple extension of our model, one
that preserves most of the underlying features of the static model we employed, may help illu-
minate the discussion. Consider a two-period lived overlapping generations model with each
cohort consisting of a continuum of agents with time endowments when young, defined over
the interval

; 

by a stationary distribution G, much as we have done here. In the first pe-
riod of life, agents allocate this time endowment to leisure or work. Labor, along with capital
(owned by the old at each date) are used to produce output, along traditional lines, and each
factor is paid its marginal product. If we assume agents consume the single consumption good
only when old, earnings when young, which is saved, becomes next period’s capital, assuming
100% depreciation of the capital stock in the production process. This framework, along with
the preferences similar to what is used in the static model, make up a cohesive dynamic model
from which we can address the issue of growth and dual response within a narrow sense of the
Dupor and Liu (2003) taxonomy.
Note, first, if the production technology displays neoclassical constant returns to scale, the
economy converges to a steady state with no sustained growth. Along the growth path, and in
the steady state, the economy may experience dual response, as consumption for all agent types
converges to a steady state; the size of the consumption minimum 'c relative to these steady
state consumption levels playing a critical rule regarding whether or not the economy exhibits
dual response. Moreover, in this environment, with growth in the capital stock, the mass of
agents running away should rise while those that keep up falls, converging to a steady state
distribution (and it is certainly possible that with growth, the offspring of those agents that keep
up at any given date may eventually run away).
On the other hand, if the economy exhibits sustained endogenous growth, such as in a mod-
ified AK growth model, the issue of the relevance of 'c and its role in delivering dual response
becomes more problematic. Of course, if an economy exhibits sustained, positive growth, wage-
growth will be sufficient, at some point, to raise the income of all agents above the threshold
level that demarks those that keep up and those that run away. More succinctly, a constant
substance-level of consumption 'c eventually becomes mute in an affluent society. However, if
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one reinterprets this minimum to be a time-varying minimum standard of living that depends
on output (i.e., 't = 'cYt), the minimum will grow with wages and the a similar sort of popula-
tion dichotomy present in the static model may also present itself along the steady state growth
path. Álvarez-Peláez and Díaz (2005) employ a similar consumption minimum in their study on
wealth dynamics.
It is worth noting, however, that introducing variable factor prices in the model, as in a stan-
dard growth environment, presents new channels for the consumption benchmark to impact
on individual consumption and work/leisure decisions. For example, different aspiration lev-
els (different values of ) will affect both aggregate labor and capital, and these in turn feed-
back on the agents’ decisions through changes in factor prices. But these effects of the Joneses’
are beyond the scope of the Dupor-Liu description of KUJ/RAJ. KUJ/RAJ within the Dupor-Liu
taxonomy is limited to outlining how changes in the consumption benchmark impacts relative
consumption and the impacts this has on the agent’s consumption/leisure/work decision. It
does not embody the general equilibrium impact of a change in the benchmark, that is, the
secondary effects the benchmark may have on market-determined factor prices. This, in turn,
suggests a broader, more comprehensive interpretation of KUJ/RAJ is needed to understand the
fuller ramifications that consumption aspirations may have in actual economies. Whether these
considerations make a dual response (in a broader sense) more or less prevalent is an open ques-
tion.
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Appendices
A Subtractive benchmarking
Suppose ci = f
 
ci; cb

= ci   B (cb) and W
 ; xi is defined for ci > B (cb). In this case
@zi
@cb
=
B0(cb)

W21
 
ci   B(cb); xi

W1
 
ci   B(cb); xi
 W11  ci   B(cb); xiW2  ci   B(cb); xi
(W1 (ci   B(cb); xi))2
written without the explicit dependencies:
@zi
@cb
=
B0(cb) [W21W1  W11W2]
(W1)
2
=
B0(cb)
ciW1

W21
W2
  ciW11
W1

Clearly whether this term is non-zero depends on the specific utility function. We can, see how-
ever, that if W21  0; then Sign

@zi
@cb

= Sign B0(cb) which is the same for all individuals and con-
sumption levels: This naturally leads to the following result: Assume f is of the additive form,
f
 
ci; cb

= ci   B (cb) ; then a necessary condition for dual response is W21 < 0:
B Generalized f-mean
The generalized f mean of two real numbersx and y is defined as g 1 (g (x) + (1  ) g (y)) ;  2
(0; 1) where g is continuously differentiable with a well-defined inverse. Note, if we take f to be
any linear function, the f mean is the arithmetic mean, if g (x) = log (x) the f mean is the geo-
metric mean and if g (x) = 1=x the f mean is the harmonic mean. To show that the aggregator
in Assumption 1 can be obtained from the generalized f mean assume that g is homogenous
of degree n and let f
 
ci; cb

= g 1

g
 
ci

+ (1  ) g

ci
cb

: Then, write
f
 
ci; cb

= g 1

g
 
ci

+ (1  ) g

ci
cb

= g 1
 
ci
n
g (1) + (1  ) g

1
cb

= cig 1

g (1) + (1  ) g

1
cb

Defining
A (cb)  g 1

g (1) + (1  ) g

1
cb

;
we have f
 
ci; cb

= ciA (cb) : Finally, note g is monotone because it is invertible:
A0 (cb) =
  1
c2b
(1  ) g0

1
cb

g0

g (1) + (1  ) g

1
cb
 < 0
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C Examples
C.1 Non-separable preferences
Example 3 (No dual response) Suppose W
 
ci; xi

=
(ci)
1 
(1 a(1+ei xi))d 1
1  as in King et. al
(1998). Then, 
 
ci

= ; W21 6= 0 (non-separable) but ciW21W2 = 1  ; in this case, @z
i
@cb
= 0 8i:
Example 4 (No dual response) Suppose W
 
ci; xi

= 11 

ci    (1 x
i)
1+
1+
1 
; the GHH prefer-
ences defined in Greenwood et al. 1998. ThenW21 6= 0 (non-separable) and
 
ci

= c
i(+1)
(ci(1+)  (1 xi)+1)
but @z
i
@cb
= 1 8i.
C.2 Separable preferences
Example 5 (No dual response) Suppose W
 
ci; xi

=
(ci)
1  1
1     
(1+ei xi)1+
1

1+ 1

as in MaCurdy
(1981). Then, W21 = 0 and 
 
ci

=  8i: In this case, @zi@cb = 1   8i:
Example 6 (No dual response) Consider the general C.E.S class of additively-separable prefer-
ences:
W
 
ci; xi

= 


 
ci

+ (1  )  xik=
where  > 0 is a constant, 0 <  < 1;   1 and 0 < k  1: In this case, the term in parenthesis on
the r.h.s of (9) is
1    ci  ciW21
W2
= :
Clearly @z
i
@cb
6= 0 ; the Joneses always affect agent i’s decisions. HereW1 = k
 
ci
 1
W k= 1;W11 =
 (k=  1)  ci 1W 1W1+(  1)  ci 1W1,W2 = k (1  )  xi 1W k= 1; andW21 = k (1  ) (k=  1)  ci 1  xi 1 V k= 2:
Using (4), we get f1f2=f12 = ci; and so the coefficient of relative risk aversion is

 
ci

=  ciW11=W1 =   (k=  1)
 
ci

W 1   (  1) : (22)
Additionally, ciW21=W2 =  (k=  1)
 
ci

W 1: Substituting these expressions into (9) yields
1    ci  ciW21W2 = : These preferences exhibit G-KUJ if  < 0 and G-RAJ if  > 0.
Example 7 (Dual response) Suppose W
 
ci; xi

=
h
(ci)

(xi)
1 i1 
1  where  > (<) 1 implies c
i
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and xi are substitutes (complements). Then, 
 
ci

=   + 1 8i and
@zi
@cb
? 0()

(1  )
A (cb)+ (1  )
 
1 + ei
 
? 1 for  > 1
@zi
@cb
? 0()
"
(1  )
A (cb)+ (1  )
 
1 + ei
    1# 7 1 for  < 1
meaning @z
i
@cb
may change sign depending on the level of ei.
Example 8 (Dual response) Let
W i
 
ci; xi

=  e ci   e xi ; ; ;  > 0: (23)
In this case, zi =   A(cb)ec
iA(cb) xi and
@zi
@cb
= ec
iA(cb) xi A0 (cb)
A (cb)

1  A (cb) ci

; (24)
with
@zi
@cb
T 0() ~cb  1
A (cb) S c
i:
Given (2), and assuming interior solutions for ci and xi, the agent’s consumption decision satisfies
e c
iA(cb)A (cb) = e [1+ei ci] (25)
DefineAb  A (cb) andmb  lnAb=. The optimal choices for consumption are linear in ei and
are given by
c^i =
mb + 
 
1 + ei

Ab +  (26)
and
x^i =
 mb + Ab
 
1 + ei

Ab +  ; (27)
where the following restriction is assumed to hold for each i:
 
1 + ei

> max f mb=;mb=Abg.
From (24) and (26), it follows
@zi
@cb
=
8<: < 0 for 1 + ei < 1 + ~e 
Ab+
   mb : L-RAJ
 0 for 1 + ei  1 + ~e  Ab+   mb : L-KUJ
: (28)
Notice, in this case, regardless of values of preference parameters, all agents with low-enough time
endowments will run away from the Joneses, while those with large-enough time endowments
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keep up.
A final example of how the sign of @zi=@cb can vary across individuals in the population:
Example 9 (Dual response) Suppose the population is split in two otherwise identical groups – e
is same for all i – except one group has preferences defined byW
 
ci; xi

=
(c1)
1 1
1 1 +
(x1)
1 1
1 1 and
the other W
 
ci; xi

=
(c1)
1 2
1 2 +
(x1)
1 2
1 2 where 1 < 1 and 2  1. Then, @z
i=@cb has a different
sign across the two groups.
While this example may seem “contrived” it is nonetheless important because this is the
channel large parts of the asset-pricing literature use to generate variation in risk preferences.
D Multiplicatively separable preferences
Assume W
 
ci; xi

= h
 
ci

v
 
xi

; where h
 
tci

= tr  h  ci ; and v is increasing and concave.
Then, we show @z
i
@cb
= 0: To see this, note in this case,
zi =   W2
 
f
 
ci; cb

; xi

W1 (f (ci; cb) ; xi)  f1 (ci; cb) =  
v0
 
xi

v (xi)
h
 
ci

h0 (ci)  f1 (ci; cb) :
Calculating the derivative of zi, we get:
@zi
@cb
=  v
0  xi
v (xi)
h0
 
ci
2  f1  ci; cb  f2  ci; cb  h00  ci  f1  ci; cb  f2  ci; cb+ h0  ci  f12  ci; cbh  ci
(h0 (ci)  f1 (ci; cb))2
=  v
0  xiA0
v (xi)A2
 
ci   h
00  ci
h0 (ci)
h
 
ci

h0 (ci)
 ci   h
 
ci

h0 (ci)
!
Using Euler’s Theorem, we have the following properties for h:
h0
 
ci

= r
h
 
ci

ci
; h00
 
ci

= (r   1) h
0  ci
ci
And finally:
@zi
@cb
=  v
0  xiA0
v (xi)A2
0@ci   (r   1) h0(ci)ci
h0 (ci)
h
 
ci

r h(c
i)
ci
 ci   h
 
ci

r h(c
i)
ci
1A
=  v
0  xiA0
v (xi)A2 c
i

1  r   1
r
  1
r

= 0
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E Reconciling two notions of KUJ/RAJ
At the optimal, W1
 
ci; 1 + ei   ci f1 = W2  ci; 1 + ei   ci : Differentiating with respect to cb,
we have:
(W11f1  W12) f1@c^i=@cb +W11f1f2 +W1f11@c^i=@cb +W1f12
= W21f1@c^
i=@cb +W21f2  W22@c^i=@cb
or
@c^i=@cb =   W11f1f2 +W1f12  W21f2
(W11f1  W12) f1 +W1f11  W21f1 +W22 (29)
Since W12 = W21; the denominator of (29) is simply the second-order condition of the agent’s
optimization problem, which we assume holds and is negative at
 
ci; xi

=
 
c^i; x^i

:Hence, the
sign of @c^i=@cb is the same as the sign of the term W11f1f2 +W1f12  W21f2:
From (8), @zi=@cb =
f2
W1f1

 W21 +W2W11W1 +W2
f12
f2f1

:Making use of the fact thatW1f1 = W2
at the optimum, we can rewrite this as:
@zi=@cb =
f2
W1f1

 W21 + f1W11 + W1f12
f2

=
1
W1f1
( W21f2 + f1f2W11 +W1f12) :
Since W1f1 > 0, the sign of @zi=@cb at the optimum is the same sign as @c^i=@cb: From the
budget constraint, x^i = 1 + ei   c^i; it follows that @zi=@cb and @x^i=@cb have opposite signs.
F Stone-Geary utility and dual response
A fairly tractable form of preferences that generate dual response is the Stone-Geary kind:
W
 
ci; xi

=
 
ci   ' +  xi1  ;  2 (0; 1) ; ' > 0 (30)
where
 
ci; x

have to satisfy ci   ' > 0 and xi > 0. As discussed in Appendix 3.5 of Bertola
et. al (2014), it is sometimes useful to think of 'c as representing some sort of a subsistence
(minimum) level of consumption. If ' = 0, then (30) is homothetic in (c; x); otherwise not. For
future use, note
W1 = 
 
ci   ' 1 ; W2 = (1  )  xi 
W11 =  (   1)
 
ci   ' 2 ; W22 =  (   1)  xi 2 ; W21 = 0
and

 
ci
   ciW11
W1
= (1  ) c
i
ci   ';
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@zi
@cb
=
ciA0 (cb)W2
W1Aci

1    ci  ciW21
W2

=
ci   '
ci   ' :
Evidently, @z
i
@cb
can change sign. Since we need ci   ' > 0, it follows dual response requires
@zi
@cb
< 0() ' < ci < '

@zi
@cb
> 0() ci > '

> 'c
Using the first order condition W2 = A (cb)W1; one can derive
ci =
'+ (A (cb))
1
1 
 
1 + ei

1 + (A (cb))

1 
 ; c^i = '+ (A (cb)) 11   1 + ei
A (cb) + (A (cb))
1
1 
and xi =
 
1 + ei
A (cb)  '
A (cb) + (A (cb))
1
1 
:
For future use, write
c^i = a+ b
 
1 + ei

(31)
a  '
A (cb) + (A (cb))
1
1 
> 0
b  (A (cb))
1
1 
A (cb) + (A (cb))
1
1 
=
(A (cb))

1 
1 + (A (cb))

1 
> 0
Notice these decision rules are linear in ei:
From (31), one can show
@a
@cb
=  a
1 + 11  (A (cb))

1 
A (cb) + (A (cb))
1
1 
@A (cb)
@cb
> 0;
@b
@cb
=

1  
b
A (cb)

1 + (A (cb))

1 
 @A (cb)
@cb
< 0
(32)
since @A(cb)@cb < 0: Using (31), it follows that V
 
yi

= b2V
 
1 + ei

: Since the sign of @b=@cb < 0;
it follows that V
 
yi

falls with an increase in the benchmark. How does the Gini of income y
respond? One can check, using (32) and for exogenous cb;
sign
@
@cb
 
y

= sign
@A (cb)
@cb
< 0
which is negative. In this case, measured income inequality is reduced relative to fundamental
inequality as the exogenous benchmark rises.
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G Proof of Proposition 3
First note, h provides a valid consumption level when
'c +
cAh
1   > 0, 'c +
cA
'c

 1cA
1   > 0,
'c  
'c

> 0, 'c

1  1


> 0:
This is satisfied by Assumption (2). Now proceed to take the derivative of zi with respect to cb. To
begin with,
@k
@cb
=   1
   1

x
Ac
 1
 1 1 x
A2cA
0 (33)
=
1
1  
A0
A k
then using
zi =  
0@k

'x +
xxi
1 

'c +
cci
1 
1A 1
we have
@zi
@cb
=   (   1)
0@k

'x +
xxi
1 

'c +
cci
1 
1A 2 @k@cb

'x +
xxi
1 

'c +
cci
1 

  k

'x +
xxi
1 

c
1 
@ci
@cb
'c +
cci
1 
2
=   (   1)
0B@(k) 2

'x +
xxi
1 
 1
'c +
cci
1 

1CA 1
1  
A0
A k

'c +
cc
i
1  

  k c
1   c
iA0

=
0B@(k) 1

'x +
xxi
1 
 1
'c +
cci
1 

1CA'c      1cci
 A0
A
Since the first term is positive and A
0
A < 0; we have
@zi
@cb
has the same sign as  'c +  1cci;
and therefore8<: @z
i
@cb
 0 if   'c +  1cci  0
@zi
@cb
 0 if   'c +  1cci  0
9=; ,
8<: @z
i
@cb
 0 if  1cci  'c
@zi
@cb
 0 if  1cci  'c
9=;,8>>>>><>>>>>:
@zi
@cb
 0 if cc
i  'c (   1) and   1
if cci  'c (   1) and   1
@zi
@cb
 0 if cc
i  'c (   1) and   1
if cci  'c (   1) and   1
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
,
8>>>>><>>>>>:
@zi
@cb
 0 if c
i  'c( 1)c and   1
if ci  'c( 1)c and   1
@zi
@cb
 0 if c
i  'c( 1)c and   1
if ci  'c( 1)c and   1
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
:
This proves the result.
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H Proof of Eq. (??)
Let y be a continuous random variable with cumulative probability distribution,F (t)  Pr fy  tg ;
and support

y; y

with 0  y (y can be1). The Gini is defined as
y =
1
y
yZ
y
F (t) (1  F (t)) dt
where y is the mean of y. In our case, y  a+ b (1 + e) : So y = a+ b
 
1 + 

and y = a+ b
 
1 + 

.
With a change of variables, F (t)  Pr fa+ b (1 + e)  tg = Pr(1 + e)  t ab 	 = G   t ab  ; or
G (z) ; where G is the CDF for the variable (1 + e) and z  t ab : With this change of variables,
bdz = dt and when t = y, z = 1 + ; likewise for y. Hence,
y =
b
y
1+Z
1+
G (z) (1  G (z)) dz
By definition,
1+e =
1
1 + e
1+Z
1+
G (z) (1  G (z)) dz
So,
y =
b (1 + e)1+e
y
Since y = a+ b (1 + e), y =
b(1+e)
a+b(1+e)1+e:
I Proof of Proposition 4
Recall
y
1+e
= b(1+e)a+b(1+e) : Then we have
@
@cb

y
1+e

=
@
@cb
b (1 + e)
a+ b (1 + e)
=
(1 + e)
[a+ b (1 + e)]2

[a+ b (1 + e)]
@b
@cb
  @a
@cb
b  @b
@cb
(1 + e) b

=
(1 + e)
[a+ b (1 + e)]2

a
@b
@cb
  @a
@cb
b

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Now, from (33) we have @k@cb =
1
1 
A0
A k, and we can calculate
@a
@cb
and @b@cb
@a
@cb
=
(1  )'x @k@cb (cA+ kx) 

cA0 + x @k@cb

(1  ) (k'x   'c)
(cA+ kx)2
=
A0
A (cA+ kx)2
[c'xAk + x'xk   (1  )'xcAk   'xxk + (1  )'ccA+ 'cxk]
=
A0 [cA ('xk   'c) + 'c (cA+ xk)]
A (cA+ kx)2
@b
@cb
=
x
@k
@cb
(cA+ kx) 

cA0 + x @k@cb

kx
(cA+ kx)2
=

1  
A0cxk
(cA+ kx)2
We can now find

a @b@cb  
@a
@cb
b

:
a
@b
@cb
  @a
@cb
b =
(k'x   'c) (1  )
(cA+ kx)

1  
A0cxk
(cA+ kx)2
  kx
(cA+ kx)
A0 [c ('xk   'c)A+ 'c (cA+ xk)]
A (cA+ kx)2
=   'cxkA (cA+ kx)2
A0
Finally, we obtain:
@
@cb

y
1+e

=
(1 + e)
[a+ b (1 + e)]2

a
@b
@cb
  @a
@cb
b

=   (1 + e)
[a+ b (1 + e)]2

'cxk
A (cA+ kx)2
A0 (cb)

It is clear from this expression that if 'c = 0; then
@
@cb

y
1+e

= 0:
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